RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CVIL

RIGHTS-EQuAL PRIVILEGEs--Managers

of

several theatres in New York refused admission to a newspape- dramatic
critic, claiming that no person had a right to enter their theatres without their
consent. At the instance of the critic a preliminary injunction was granted,
restraining the managers from further refusing him admittance. Woolcott
v. Shubert, 154 N. Y. Supp. 754 (1915).
The decision in this case rested upon the validity of a statute which provided that all persons within the jurisdiction should be entitled to "full and
equal accommodations, advantages and privileges of any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement." Such places are so clothed with a
public interest that they lose iheir status as private enterprises to the effect
that all patrons may demand equal treatment. The principal case raised this
point for the first time in New York.
Similar statutes have been enacted in various other States, generally for
the purpose of preventing discrimination between whites and negroes. So,
recovery of a specizlly provided penalty was allowed to a negress who was
refused admission to a theatre upon presentation of a ticket procured for her
by a white peifsqn. Bayhes v. Curry, 128 I1. 287 (1889); Joseph v. Bidwell, 28
La. Ann. 382 (1876), in accord. As to whether a skating rink is a public place
of amusement there are decisions on both sides. See People v. King, tio N. Y.
418 (1888); Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Ia. 536 (1885), contra. A billiard room has
been held not to come within the terms of such a statute. Com. v. Sylvester,
95 Mass. 247 (1866).
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-MILAID PROPERTY-A person while riding on
a street car, picked up a package of money left on the seat, took it home and
concealed it. Held: The package was not lost, but mislaid; it was still constructively in the possession of the owner, although its custody was in the
trolley company; hence the taking with intent to appropriate was larceny.
State v. Courtsol, 94 AtI. Rep. 973 (Conn. -915)There is a distinction in 'he criminal law between the taking of goods
that are lost, and those merely mislaid. Where goods are lost, the taking, no
matter with what intent, does not constitute larceny, 2 Russell on Ctimes, loo;
although this doctrine is considerably modified in some jurisdictions. Ransom
v. State, 22 Conn: 153 (1852). It must be taken with great limitations and
applies only where the finder really believes the goods to have been lost.
Where an owner leaves an article, but later remembers where he left it and
speedily seeks it, the yroperty is not lost but mislaid and must be treated as
being constructively in possession of the owner. State v. Courtsol, supra.
So an article left on the counter of a store in the presence of the defendant
is not lost, but mislaid, State v. McCann, 19 Mo. 249 0.853); or a purse
dropped in a highway with owner's name written legibly in It. State v. Weston, 9 Conn. 527 (832).
But see contra: Porter v. State, Martin & Yerger,
226 (Tenn. 1827). The finder must act in good faith. If there be any mark
on the article, or if it be found in a place where identification can be easily
obtained, the article is mislaid and not lost, and if the finder fail to take steps
necessary to locate the owner, but conceals or converts the article, he is guilty
of larceny. People v. McGarren, 17 Wend. 46o (N. Y. 1837).

EvmErcE-D..AR.0NoNs AGAINST INTERST-In an action for damages

by a passenger, who as injured in a wreck, against the railroad corpany,
the latter, to show that negligence had not caused the accident, attemptcd, but
tailed to introduce a sworn statement made ten d-tys after the wreck by a
third person to the effect that he had wrecked the train. After the statement
but before the trial of this case, he was adjudged insane. Held: The refusal
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to admit the sworn statement was error. Weber v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.,
xi N. \V. Rep. 852 (Iowa, 1915).
The theory upon which declarations against interest are admitted as evidence is that of necessity. In England the declarant must be dead in order
to meet the required condition of necessity. Harrison v. Blades, 3 Camp. 458
(Eng. 1813). In America, the great majority of cases follow the English
rule that death is absolutely necessary. Currier v. Gale, 14 Gray, 5o4 (Mass.
i 6o) ; Lowry v. Moss, i Strob. 63 (S. C. 1846) ; Weber v. Ry. Co., supra, at
page 869. In Buchanan v. Moore, io S. & R. 275 (Pa. 1823), death was sufficient, but nothing was said about insanity being insufficient. Absence from
the jurisdiction is not sufficient in any jurisdiction. Brewster v. Doane, 2
Hill, 537 (N. Y. x842).
On the other hand, a small minority of cases, supported by the textbook writers, hold that the necessity for introducing the statements is as
great where the declarant has become insane or otherwise incapable of testifyon
ing as where he is dead, and therefore admit such statements. Wigmore
Evidence, Vol. 2, §i456. In Griffith v. Sauls, 77 Tex. 630 (i8go), the declaration against interest of a living declarant was admitted when his physical
condition prevented a deposition or an appearance. In Rothrock v. Gallagher,
(i Pa. io8 (1879), loss of memory because of ill-health and age was sufficient
necessity to admit a declaration against interest. See also dicta in Jones v.
Henry, 84 N. C. 324 (1881), and County of Mahaska v. Ingalls, x6 Iowa, 81

(16).

EVIDENCE-DECLARATI3NS AGAINST INTEREST--In an action on a promissory
note, of which a married woman was maker and her husband, payee, the
defense was that no liability attached to the maker, because she was an accom1893.
modation maker, and hence not liable according to the Act of June 8,maker
Held: Declarations by the payee that his wife was an accommodation time
were excluded, because the declarations offered were not confined to the
during which the husband owned the notes. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank

v. Donnelly, 247 Pa. s18 (i9's).

One of the principal reasons for the admittance of declarations against
interest is that, being against interest, there is no motive to misrepresent, but
the
instead a strong guaranty of truth is furnished. i6 Cyc. M2i9. Today
of
statement must be of a fact against the pecuniary or proprietary interest
i8 (i9o2);
the declarant. Halvorsen v. Moore, etc., Lumber Co., 87 Minn.not
sufficient
Swan v. Morgan, 34 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1895). A penal interest is
in most States. People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595 (89); Con v. Densmore, 12
Allen, 537 (Mass. 1866). Contra: Martin v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 317 a(1894).
penal
This distinction between a pecuniary or proprietary interest and
Enginterest is a development of the first half of the last century. The early (Eng.
lish cases made no such distinction. Hulet's Trial, 5 How. St. 118515 East,
(Eng. i8o8) ; Doe v. Robson,
i66o) ; Higham v. Ridgway, Io East, 9og
not to include the state34 (Eng. 1812). However, in 1844, the- rule was heldliability.
Sussex Peerage
ment of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal
and
Case, ii Cl. & F. io9 (Eng. i844). Wigmore criticizes the distinction
claims that it is not universally accepted by any means. Wig-more on Evidence, 01477.

EviThe interest must likewise be an actual interest. Chamberlayne on
The interest
dence, §2782; Clason v. Baldwin, 56 Hun, 326 (N. Y. i89o).
v.
must not be prospective or contingent, as that of a former owner, v.Moehn
Massie,
Moehn, 105 Iowa, 710 (1898); or of a prospective heir. Morton
the declarant actually
3 Mo. 482 (i834). If it can be shown aliunde that
regarded it as for his interest, although actually against it, the declaration
will be excluded. Taylor v. Witham, 4s L. J. Ch. 798 (x876).
a prosecuEVIDENc--FNGER PRINTS-PHTOGRAPHIC REnaODUCrONs-In
of
tion for burglary the State sought to introduce in evidence photographs
finger marks made at the place where the crime was committed, and impres-
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sions made from defendant's fingers, in order to show that they were identical. Held: Such evidence is proper and admissible. State v. Connors, 94
Atl. Rep. 812 (N. J. 1915).
In principle, the admission of such evidence is based upon the theory that
the evolution of the progressive and scientific tendencies of the age cannot be
ignored in legal procedure, but that the law will allow evidence of these scientific processes which are the work of educated and skillful men in their various
departments, leaving the weight and effect to be given to their results to the
consideration of the jury. State v. Cerciello, 86 N. J..L 314 (1914). Upon
this theory it is that the testimony of an expert in handwriting is recognized,
West v. State, 22 N. J. L 212 (I849); that a photographic impression of the
defendant may be used, Ruloff's Case, 45 N. Y. 213 (1871); that a comparison
between the size and shape of the defendant's shoes and footprints found
near the scene of a crime may be introduced, State v. Morris. 84 N. C. 756
(i84I); Commonwealth v. Pope, 103 Mass. 44o (1869).
Similarly it is
not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the
accused and the bloody print of a hand on the wall of a house where the
crime was committed, State v. Miller, 71 N. J. L. 528 (i904) ; or testimony of
the resemblance between spots on clothing produced and spots cut out of
same clothing and used by experts in determining whether they were blood
spots. State v. Miller, supra.
It must be remembered, however, that the condition upon which this testimony is received is that the finger prints. etc., made by the defendant should
have been made voluntarily by him; otherwise the production of such evidence
would have the legal effect of compelling the defendant to testify against himself against his will. State v. Ah Chuey, i4 Nev. 79 (1879).
EVIDENCE--OTHER OFFENcs-After commanding the deceased to throw
up his hands, the prisoner fired a shot, which proved fatal, and fled. Evidence of other robberies committed by the accused in the same locality and at
approximately the same time, was introduced to show an intent to rob in the
particular instance and thereby to convict of murder in the first degree, the
homicide having occurred while committing an act of robbery. Held: The
admission of the evidence was not error. Hiller v. People, I49 Pac. Rep. 250
(Colo. i915).
Although all the cases are agreed that evidence of similar acts, even
though criminal, may be introduced to prove the intent with which a particular act has been done, Crum v. State, 148 Ind. 401 (1897) ; State v. Johnson,
III La. 935 (i9o4), this result has been reached by two lines of reasoning.
The majority of cases lay down the principle, as a general rule of criminal evidence, that on the trial of a person accused of crime, pro6f of a distinct, independent offence is inadmissible. People v. Mlolineux, i68 N. Y. 264
(igo1).
But when the evidence of the independent crime tends to prove
motive, intent, identity of the accused or a common plan or scheme, then an
exception to the general rule is recognized and the evidence is admitted.
State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. io5 (1874); State v. Ward, 91 'N. W. Rep. 898
(Iowa, 1902). However, where the facts constituting the offence and the
very act itself are sufficient evidence of intent, further evidence of intent, as
shown by the commission of similar offences is inadmissible. State v. Spray,
74 S. W. Rep. 846 (Mo. 9o93).
On the other hand, Wigmore's general rule is that similar acts are admissible when they are relevant, i. e., to show motive, intent, etc.. If they are
relevant, they are admitted in spite of their criminality. If they are irrelevant,
there is also a further reason for excluding them in that they violate the
Character Rule. People v. Tucker, 1o4 Cal. 44o (1894); Com. v. Robinson,
146 Mass. 57i (18,) ; Wigmore on Evidence, §§26, 302, 305. It will be seen
that the ultimate resalt in the two classes of cases is practically the same. The
difference is that Wigmore does not recognize a general rule excluding prior
or subsequent criminal acts. other than the Character Rule, while the majority
of courts have laid down such a rule as a general principle.

RECE.VT CASES
EVIDENCE-PIYSICAL

EXAMINATION-DISCRETION

OF THE

CoutT-In an

actiun for damages for injuries arising out of an assault and battery, the court
directed that the plaintiff should submit herself to a physical examination to
ascertain the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries received. Upon
her refusal to comply, a judgment of non pros. was entered against her.
Held: It was within the discretion of the trial court to order a physical examination of the plaintiff. When exercised, however, its exercise is not ground
for reversal unless manifestly abused. Schefiler v. Lee, 94 AtI. Rep. 907
(Md. 1915).

Jurisdictions are divided on the question as to whether courts have the
power to order a plaintiff to submit his person to a physical examination. The
federal courts have no such power, it never having been conferred on them
by the Constitution or Laws of the United States. Union Pacific v. Borland,
141 U . 250 (i89). Some States hold that no such common law power has
ever been conferred on them and that one's person is inviolate. Loyd v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. 53 Mo. 509 (873) ; Parker v. Enslow, io2 IlL 27
(1882) ; but an unreasonable refusal to show one's injuries, when asked to do
so, may be considered by the jury as bearing on one's good faith as in any
other case of a party refusing to produce the best evidence in his power.
Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. 242 (1846); Bryant v. Stilwell, 24 Pa. 314 (1855).
The weight of auliomity in the State courts, however, seems to be in accord
with our principal case. While the power to compel a physical examinatiou
is admitted, many cautions and limitations are suggested, and the general rule
is that it cannot be demanded as a matter of right by a defendant, but the
application is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and such
discretion will not be interfered with by an appellate court, unless manifestly
abused. United Rys. v. Cloman, io7 Md. 69o (igo8); Schroeder v. Chicago
Ry. Co., 47 Ia. 375 (1877).
EVIDENCE- PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-PaYsIciANs-In a criminal
prosecution, a witness was questioned concerning certain statements made by
her to a doctor relative to her condition. Held: Such statements were admissible. In the absence of statute, communications to doctors in their professional capacity are not privileged. O'Brien v. State, 4 Atl. Rep. io54 (Md.

1915).

At the common law, information imparted confidentially to a physician in
the course of his attendance in a professional capacity was never privileged.
Neither physician nor patient were entitled to refuse to testify to such information, however confidentially imparted. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 1 How.
St. Tr. 643 (Eng. i55o) ; Rex v. Gibbons, i Car. & P. 97 (Eng. 1823). It was
very early recognized that every reason that supports the privilege as to communications between attorney and client applied with equal force to the relationship existing between physician and patient. Greenough v. Gaskell, i
Mylne & K. 98, 103 (Eng. 1833) ; so much so that the common law rule has been
changed in many jurisdictions. See statutory.provisions in various States, and
note, 17 Am. St. Rep. 565.
But even under the statutes, the same essential elements are necessary to
support the privilege as in the case of attorney and client. The consultation
must be made with a professional physician or surgeon in the general acceptance of the words. This does not include a veterinary surgeon, Hendershot
v. Western U. Teleg. Co., io6 Ia. 529 (1898); nor a druggist, Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 66 Mo. 597 (1877) ; nor a dentist, People v. De France.
io4 Mich. 563 (1895); nor a consultation for purposes other than medical
aid, Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194 (,i895); nor an autopsy, Harrison v. Sut.
ter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. i56 (1897). The object of the privilege being to pro.
tect the patient, Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238 (897), it is protected under any
form and extends to consulting physicians. Renihan v. Dennin, io3 N. Y. 573
(1886) ; professional partners, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384 (i8t) ;
and covers all information imparted during professional employment. Finnegan v. Sioux City, 112 Ia. 232 (igoo); but see contra, McGowan v. Supr.
Ct., o4 Wis. 173 (x899).
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TO SUMMON JURY-DETERmINATION OF

SANirv-ln habeas corpus proceedings, on the question as to whether the
prisoner had regained his sanity, the court, at the'request of the prisoner, summoned a jury to hear the case. Held: A court has the inherent power, in
habeas corpus proceedings, to summon a jury to aid it in reaching a conclu
sion on disputed questions of fact. People v. Hendrick, io9 N. E. 486 (N. Y.
1915).

While a trial by jury cannot be demanded by the prisoner or respondent
in habeas corpus proceedings as a matter of right, the court may in its discretion order any controverted fact in the matter to be tried by a jury. providing
that the judge does not. by so doing, intend to evade the responsibility of ultimately deciding the issue which has been raised, but simply intends to take
the verdict of such jury by way of aid and advice in reaching his decision.
This is true in all cases of doubtful fact. Graham v. Graham, i S. & R. 33o
(Pa. ISIS) ; such as doubt as to the proper person being a prisoner, Respublica v. Gaoler of Philadelphia County, 2 'eates, 258 (Pa. 1797) ; or doubt as
to whether a convict had violated his parole or not, People v. Burns, z8 N. Y.
Supp. 30o (1894). The contrary doctrine prevails in some jurisdictions, where
it is said that the court alone is the proper authority to pass on any and all
questions involved. State v. Farlee, i N. J. L. 41 (179o).
L tLORD AND TENANT- DESTRUCTION OF PREMISEs-The defendant
leased a barn to the plaintiff for five years. During the term the barn burned.
The lessor rebuilt the barn, and on the completion thereof the lessee tendered
his rent and demanded possession, but the lessor declined his offer and withheld possession of the new barn. During the interval between the date of the
fire and the completion of the barn there was neither tender of rent nor
demand therefor. Held: The lease of a building includes the land whereon
it stands. Hence the obligation to pay rent and the reciprocal right of possession in the lessee continued after the fire. Gainer v. Griffith, 85 S. E. Rep.
713 (V. Va. 1915).

The well-established rule of the common law is that the liability of the
tenant for the rent called for by the lease is in no way affected by the fact
that buildings on the land leased are destroyed by some unforeseen casualty.
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32 (19o3); Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187
Mass. 402 .(905). This rule, however, has been disapproved in a few jurisdictions as bearing with undue severity upon the tenant. Wattles v. South
Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 5o Neb. 251 (1897); Whittaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan.
674 (1881). In South Carolina it has been repudiated in cases of destruction
of the premises by the act of God or of the public enemies, but the common law
rule still prevails in case of destruction by fire, since to throw the loss upon
the lessor would tend to diminish the interest which the tenant has in protecting the property from fire. Coogan v. Parker, 2 S. C. 255 (1870). When only
a room or a portion of a building is leased, it has been held that the common
law rule does not apply, a distinctioh being drawn between the lease of apartmerts in a house and the house itself. McMillan v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356
€x868).
PROPERTY-HIGHWAYs-ABANDONMENT-A

certain highway had not been

used for sixty years; land records made no mention of it for seventy years;
it had become unpassable, except for pedestrians; it had been enclosed and its
existence antedated the memory of the oldest witnesses. Held: If a highway
ever existed it had been abandoned by long-continued disuse and had reverted
to the grantees of the original dedicators. Newkirk v. She-wood, 94 AtL Rep.
982 (Conn. t9i5).

The old common law doctrine still in force in many jurisdictions, is that
there can be no loss of a public right in a highway by mere non-user, Smith v.
State, 23 N. J. L. 130 (185x) ; and that a highway does not cease from nonuser until discontinued by the proper authorities. Knowles v. Knowles, 25
R. I. 325 (19o3). T% doctrine has been modified, and it is often held that,
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as a highway is nothing but ar. easement, the right to it can be extinguished Ly
abandonment, Lye v. Lesia, 64 Mich. x6 (1887) ;Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co.
v. O'ConnoC, 37 Ind. 95 (1871). On the question as to what constitutes abandonment by non-user, fifteen years adverse possession has been held sufficient
to bar the public right. Litchfield v. Wilmot, 2 Root, 288 (Conn. 1795).. Similarly abandonment for thirty-six years, Jeffersonville, etc., Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, supra. But the abandonment by non-user must be complete; mere partial
abandonment by reason of diversion of traffic to other roads is not sufficient,
Lewiston v. Proctor, 27 111.'414 (1862) ;nor will failure to use a road exactly as'
laid out for ten years bar the public from claiming it as originally established.
Bannister v. O'Connor, 113 Ia. s4i (igoi). A party purchasing land through
which an unused road runsi of which he has no notice actual or of record,
will be protected against the public, whose officers have been negligent in
asserting their rights. Riley v. Brodie, So N. Y. Supp. 347 (1898).
SALES--ExCHANc" DisTiNcUSHsn FOM "SAan-Land was sold for an
agreed price, to be paid for by a stock of goods and certain fixtures. Held:
This was a sale. Brunsvold v. Medgorden, 153 N. W. Rep. 163 (Iowa, 1915).
There is 'some conflict amongst the decisions as to the distinction between
a sale and an exchange. Lucas v. County Rcorder, io6 N. W. Rep. 217
(Neb. i915).. In a majority of jurisdictions the distinction is that in a sale
a price is attached to the artic.le sold, ,vhich may be received ;n money, Fuller
v. Duren, 36'Ala. 73 (i86o); or in a chattel at an estimated price, r"ichard
v. McCormick, zi Mich. 68 (z862); whereas in an exchange one chattel is
given for another, no price being attached, Thornton v. Moody, 24 S. W.
Rep. 331 (Tex. 1893). In other jurisdictions it is an exchange if the consideration is paid in goods or merchandise, even though the articles ar
exchanged at an estimated price. Cooper v. State, 37 Ark. 412 (i8fi). That
is, to have a sale the purchase price must be paid in money. Comm; v. Davis.
75 Ky. 240 (1876). Some jurisdictions refuse to draw a distinction between
a sale and an exchange. Kennedy v. Sommerville, 68 Mo. App. 222 (iE96);
Howard v. Harris, 95 Mass. 297 (1864); where the court said that the legal
distinction between a sale and an exchange of property was purely artificial.

